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I. Introduction
Do financial  factors such as cash flows and financial leverage influence firms’investment? This question has been a fashionable topic in the last ten years, pioneeredby contribution of Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) and motivated by a growing
literature on asymmetric information in financial markets.1  Contrary to Modigliani and Miller’s
claim, most of the recent studies (e.g., Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991) show that
financial factors such as availability of internal finance (net worth) do influence a firm’s
investment, reflecting the existence of constraints for the firm in raising external finance. The
reason is that under asymmetric information in financial markets, the costs of external finance
are higher than those of internal finance, leading to the existence of a ‘premium on external
funds’, which is inversely related to a firm’s net worth (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Any
shock in an economy such as an increase in interest rates or a depreciation in assets prices
affects the firms’ net worth, and hence the premium it has to pay for external funds. This, in
turn, influences the ability of firms to raise external funds and thus investment. As a result,
monetary policy affects output, not only through the standard money/interest channel, but
also trough alteration of the wedge between the internal and external funds. This additional
channel is called as the balance sheet channel’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).2  Alternatively,
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist. (1996, 1998) labelled such a mechanism as the ‘financial
accelerator’, refering to the role of financial/credit market imperfections in amplifying any
initial monetary shock. This balance sheet channel predicts a distributional impact of monetary
policy; since it operates largely through smaller firms which are likely to face a proportionately
larger premium for external funds.3  As pointed out by Bernanke et al. (1996), at the beginning
of a recession, the financial accelerator generates the flight to quality’, a shift in credit shares
from firms with higher agency costs to those with lower agency costs. This phenomenon is
implicitly highlighted by IMF (1999, pp.83) in its recent assessment of the Asian financial
crisis :
…..in this environments [in the aftermath of the crisis], many borrowers that previously had
access to credit (especially small and medium size enterprise) found themselves unable to obtain
1 See the surveys by Schiantarelli (1997) and Hubbard (1998)
2 This channel is one of two versions of the ‘credit channel’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The other version is the
bank lending channel’ referring to the narrower credit channel in which a tight monetary policy reduces supply of
bank loans and thus investments by bank dependent borrowers. In the balance sheet channel, a thight monetary
policy weakens the credit worthiness of firm (small, independent firms) and hance reduces their ability to raise any
outside funds, not necessarily bank loans
3 There is a volume of evidence suggesting that smaller firms more financially constrained, see surveys cited in
footnote 1.
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financing. The counterpart of this cutoff of access to credit could be an increased share of credit going to
capitalize interest on loans to companies perceived as more credit worthy (especially to larger
companies…..)
This paper investigates the role of financial factors (cash flows and leverage) on
Indonesian firms’ investment, hence, indirectly it examines the existence of the balance sheet
channel of monetary transmission mechanism. This is in line with the studies by Gertler and
Hubbard (1988) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), inter alia, a part of research agenda on the
asymmetric information based monetary transmission mechanism.
In investigating the role of financial factors on firm’s investment, we use Tobin’s q and
the Euler models of investment augmented by financial factors (cash flows and leverage). It is
well known that in the q investment equation, significant coefficient on financial factors like
cash flows may arise because the variable contains information on future investment
opportunities, not captured by the Tobin’s q; which is subject to mismeasurement (Schiantarelli,
1996). Using the Euler equation, in addition to the q equation, we are able to check the
consistency of the results. In estimation, we use panel data of non financial Indonesian firms
listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, from 1993-1997, during which a large surge in foreign
capital inflows was evident. Thus, the period provides a setting in which to evaluate the role
of foreign sources of funds tapped by the Indonesian large firms, which has partly contributed
to the recent financial crisis. Unlike many previous studies which used the first-differences
GMM method (Arrelano and Bond, 1991), we use novel econometric method for panel data
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to reduce the small sample bias due to the use of a
small time series sample.
In addition to the full sample estimation, we use sub-samples of firms classified according
to an a priori degree of financial constraints using various criteria, i.e., the institutional
characteristics (whether firms are affiliated with bank-business groups), firms size (total sales)
and financial conditions (financial leverage and dividend pay-out). Overall, the results suggest
the existence of financial constraints and agency costs for Indonesian firms is raising external
funds. Agency costs vary across firms according to whether the firms are members of large
business groups and whether their future investment opportunities are recognized by markets.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the role of financial structure in
investment and its implication for channels of monetary policy. Section 3 provides descriptive
statistics of the pattern of firms’ financing in Indonesia. Section 4 sets out the methodology
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which we employ in this study. Section discusses data and econometric methods. Section 6
reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the paper, conclusions and its
policy implications.
II. Asymmetric Information, Investment and The Channel of Monetary
Policy
In a celebrated paper on a theory of the financial market, Modigliani and Miller (1958)
argue that a firm’s financial structure is irrelevant to investment. The crux of the proposition
is that under the assumption of a perfect financial market, firms can raise whatever level of
funds they want at a prevailing rate to finance their investment. Accordingly, since external
funds are a perfect substitute for internal funds, the firms investment is independent of its
financial structure; it is merely dependent on the investment opportunities (expected
profitability). However, the condition of perfect capital market is far from reality, i.e., external
finance and internal finance are not perfect substitutes. In addition to different tax treatment,
agency costs and asymmetric information between firm’s managers and investors create a
premium on external finance and lead to external finances (debt and equity issues) being
more costly than internal finance.
The application of the economics of imperfect information in financial markets explains
why external finance can create agency costs or premia. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue
that due to the limited liability feature in debt contract and to ineffective monitoring, agents
(firm managers) can create moral hazard problems by making excessively risky investments.
There is an incentive to take excessively risky actions because with a high level of debt, the
firm retains most of the profits if the project is successful while debt holders incur most of the
losses if the project ends in failure. Equity issues can also generate a similar outcome. Under
imperfect information, since managers hold a very small portion of the shares, they will have
little incentive to work hard to generate the firm’s profits. In addition to moral hazard problems,
imperfect information.
Form of the external finance, with imperfect information the value of the firm would be
lower than it would be under perfect information, creating agency costs or premium for
obtaining external finance. The premium compensates investors for costs incurred in
evaluating project and monitoring the borrower. Consequently, firms which have a higher
level of internal finance are more willing to make investment. A corollary is that the investment
decisions made by a firm with higher agency costs and thus paying higher premium such as
a small, unlisted firm, should be more sensitive to the availability of internal funds. In sum,
the firm’s financial factors (the availability of internal funds, accessibility to external funds)
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do matter in a firms investment decision. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 1.4
Figure 1  illustrates firms demand for capital investment and the supply of funds to the
firms. Under a perfect capital market where a firm can raise whatever  funds needs at a
prevailing rate r (the real interest rate), the supply of funds in s horizontal line at r : In this case,
the equilibrium capital stock is the intersection between the supply of funds and the demand
for capital stock (D) at K*. Demand for capital investment is determined by a firm’s investment
opportunities (i.e., its expected future profitability). In Figure 1, an increase in investment
opportunities shifts the demand curve to the right. At a given cost of capital, r, an increase in
investment opportunities will increase the capital investment. However, the S curve is
determined only by the real interest rate. An increase in the interest rate, all else being equal,
reduces the desired capital investments. In short, under a perfect capital market, the firms
investment is determined only by the cost of funds and investment opportunities, while internal
funds (F) do not play any role.
Under an imperfect financial market in which agency costs play a part, the S curve is no
longer flat for all levels of capital stock. Up to a level internal funds F0, the S curve is horizontal
at r However, when the level of investment is greater than the available internal funds F0 and the
firm raises external funds the S curve becomes upward sloping. The upward sloping S curve is
derived from the prediction that the more external funds the firm raises, the higher is the
Cost of funds S’(F0)
S(F0)
S(F1)
D
Capital Stock
F0 K’0 F1 K0 K1 K*
r
4 See Hubbard (1998), Gertler and Hubbard (1988) or Oliner and Rudebusch (1996).
Figure 1
Firm’s net worth and investment
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probability of moral hazard that can be arise and hence the higher premium the firm will have
to pay. At the level of internal funds F0   , the equilibrium capital stock is at K0 which is lower
than it would be under a perfect financial market. A more important implication of Figure 1 is
that with an increase in a firms internal funds, from F0 to F1, the upward sloping part of S curve
shifts to the right from S (F0) to S (F1). When the investment opportunities are constant (D constant),
a rise in internal funds increase the investment from K0 to K1. Furthermore, we can notice that for
firms facing a higher premium, the slope of the S curve (S0 ) is steeper than that of a firms facing
a lower premium. Therefore, a change in internal finance for the former, all else being equal,
influences its investment more strongly than it would the latter.
Microeconomic analysis of corporate finance under imperfect information has a
significant implication for macroeconomic analysis, particularly in understanding the
mechanism through which monetary policy influences corporate investment, and hence
aggregate economic activity. In a standard money/interest rate channel of monetary policy,
assuming a perfect financial market, a decrease in bank reserves due to a monetary contraction
raises short-term interest rates and the user cost of capital. Accordingly, this depresses interest
sensitive spending. In Figure 1, under perfect information, an increase in the interest rate
reduces the optimal capital stock, ceteris paribus.
The imperfect information which characterizes financial markets provides an additional
channel of monetary policy to the real sectors. A monetary contraction that raises the interest
rate not only raises the cost of capital, but also reduces the present value of collateralisable net
worth and hence increases the marginal cost of external finance. As a result of the increasing
cost of external finance, investment spending will be depressed. In an imperfect information
version of the IS-LSM model, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) also shows that reducing the net
worth of firms as a result of monetary policy shock provides adverse effects on the firms’
investment. Furthermore, it can be predicted that constrained firms (small firms without  good
reputation, high leverage firms, and firms with a high retention ratio) will be more severely
affected by the monetary contraction as they are charged a higher premium for external finance.
In consequence, their investment spending will fall more than that of unconstrained firms.
III. Financial Structure of Indonesian Firms
The financing of non-financial firms varies across countries according to the institutional
structure of the countries-financial systems. According to the conventional wisdom, Japanese
and German financial systems are characterized as ‘bank based finance where banks play a
major role in the financing of the non-financial sectors. While Anglo-Saxon (UK and US)
financial systems are typically associated with equity based finance’ (Walter, 1993). However,
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Meyer (1990) revealed a surprising finding, contrary to the conventional wisdom. While
retentions are a dominant source of financing in industrialized countries5 , their role is greatest
in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Bank loans are also dominant sources of finance in all countries,
but their share is surprisingly small in Germany. Murinde, Mullineux, and Agung
(forthcoming), furthermore, found that the pattern of corporate finance in the European
countries is converging toward equity finance.
The financial structure of the corporate sector in developing countries has been a subject
of recent studies (Singh and Hamid, 1992, and Glen and Pinto, 1994). These studies surprisingly
suggest  that firms in developing countries in general rely very heavily on external finance and the
role of external finance in the developing countries is more important than it is in industrialized
countries6 . When more external financing became available in developing countries, partly as a
result of financial deregulation, including deregulation of capital markets in the early 1990s, firms
grew faster (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1994). The 1990s also saw a marked growth in
investor interest in emerging market instruments, both in the form of direct access to the foreign
capital market7  and  through portfolio investment in the emerging markets. For Indonesia, a
qualitative survey of forty large publicly traded Indonesian firms by Ang, Fatemi, Tourani-Rad
(1997) suggest that bank loans and internal funds are the most important source of finance.
Although internal funds are perceived to be a cheaper source of funds than external funds,
6 Alba et al. (1998) argue that this surprising finding is attributable to the fact that larger younger firms were chosen
in the sample from the developing countries than from the industrialized countries Hence they easier to access and
needed relatively more external funds.
7 Through borrowings from international commercial banks or through issuing equities and bonds in international
capital markets.
5 The latter are Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US.
Figure 2.
Sources of finance (as percentage of total funds)
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study found no significant evidence of an asymmetric information problem between the large
firms and outsiders/lenders. Interviews conducted by Glen and Pinto (1994) suggest that the
firms’ choice of source of funds is much more influenced by the volume, rather than the cost of
funds, that they can access in order to extend their market share. The firms acknowledge that they
were forced to obtaining a listing on the domestic stock exchange in order to gain access to cheaper
foreign sources.
In the following, we employ company accounts’ data to shed some light on the financing
behavior of Indonesia non financial firms over the period 1993-1997. The result derive from
individual firm accounts compiled by FT-Extel Company Research.8  Firms have three main
sources of finance : internal funds (retained earnings), new debt issues (short and long term)
and new equity issues.
Figures 2 and 3, and Table 1 illustrate the composition of firms’ funds as percentage of
total funds and firms debt equity ratio. The latter is calculated as an average of the debt to
equity ratio of the sample firms reported in the individual firm’s balance sheet. The figure
confirms that internal funds are an important source of finance. However, when we compare
the internal vs external funds (debt and equity), the total external funds have constantly
dominated the internal funds since 1994, possible due to  an increase of long-term debts since
8 See section 1. For detailed sources of data.
Figure 3.
Leverage (%) of Indonesian firms
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that year as result of increase in foreign borrowing. New debt issues constantly surpass new
equity issues during the period, especially since 1994. This is also reflected in the constant
increase in the firms’ leverage since 1994. It can be observed that the proportion of debts to
total funds increased very substantially in 1997 as a result of the financial crisis. Due to the
large scale depreciation and the dramatic rise in interest rates in the crisis, loans in foreign
currency became very high in local terms, and at the same time, the interest costs increased
and profits declined. Accordingly, in 1997 the proportion of debts increased and the internal
funds (retained earnings) declined. The financial leverage was about 250% on average in
1997, almost twice as large as the previous year.
Next, we turn to a more detailed description of firms financing. In particular, we examine
how financing varies across different types of companies according to whether firms are
members of  a large business group owning foreign exchange banks and according to firms’
size (total sales). There do not appear to be significant differences in the proportion of internal
and external funds between affiliated and non-affiliated firms. i.e. around 40 % of firms’
investment is self-financed and around 60% comes from outside. But, debt figures suggest
that the firms associated with banks and business groups have more access to long-term
debts, which includes long-term loans. This is not surprising considering their close
relationship with their own banks and also state banks. As suggested by Barclay and Smith
(1995), the maturity structure of debts reflects the degree of firms’ riskiness : less risky firms
with a lower degree of asymmetric information tend to use longer-term debt. To the extent that
a close relationship between firms and business groups and banks reduces the degree of
Tabel 1.
Sources of funds of Indonesian firm’s
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asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, this group of firms is able to longer
term debts. It can also be noted that the debt-equity ratio of the affiliated firms is larger that of
independent firms. This is consistent with our presumption that the strong relationship with
a banks-business group reduces the cost of debt finance. Hoshi et al. (1991) also found a
similar pattern, i.e., firms which are members of Keiretsu have a higher debt-equity ratio.
Examining the source of finance for large and small firms reveals the following facts.
The percentage of external finance for small firms is higher than for larger firms. Perhaps
small firms are more likely in the early periods of their life-cycle to need more external sources
to finance the growth of investment. However, it appears that the debt equity ratio of large
firms is greater than that of small firms. This confirms many empirical studies (see for example,
Scott and Martin, 1976) that as larger firms have better creditworthiness and thus pay lower
interest rates on debt issues, then the larger a firm is, the more debt capital it uses.
Finally, we differentiate the sample of firms across different industry sectors. There is
no established consensus as to whether financial structure is related to industry sector.
However, intuitively, it might be supposed that firms in the same industry experience similar
business risks as they face similar supply and demand uncertainty. Hence, it is reasonable to
suppose that they would choose c certain amount of debt (Ferri and Jones, 1979). Table 3
provides a summary of sources of finance for eight industry sectors. There appear to be
interesting differences in financing behavior between industries. Textile/clothing, chemical,
and food/pharmaceutical industries appear to have the highest external funds and financial
leverage. The chemical and machine/engineering industries seem to have the highest long-
term debt finance. On the other hand, the mining industry appears to be the most self-financed
and to have the least leverage.
Table 2.
Sources of finance, full Sample split by bank-group affiliation and size,
1993-1997, (%)
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IV. Methodology
4.1. Tests for Financial Constrains and Investment
Testing the effects of cash flows on a firms investment pose some challenges in empirical
investigations. The paramount challenge is to control for investment opportunities in order to
determine that the shifts in investment take place as a result of a change in a firm’s net worth
(supply of capital funds), not because of the shifts in demand for capital stock induced by the
investment opportunities. Two approaches have been adopted to tackle this problems : first,
the investment model including Tobin’s q (Tobin, 1969) and second, the Euler equation
approach. In this study we use both approaches to check the consistency of our results. The
two neo-classical approaches of investment for a firm are actually derived from the same firms
value maximization (see Appendix 1). In the appendix, the two equations a derived from the
firm’s value maximisation problem in which the cash flow identity incorporates the agency
costs of external finance (see also Chirinko, 1993 or Galeotti et al., 1994).
In the Tobin’s q investment model, under certain conditions9 , the investment
opportunities can be captured by the average q (as the proxy of unmeasurable marginal q),
that is, the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its capital (Hayashi,
1982). According to the theory, q should be the only determinant of investment and no other
variable should matter. If there is no friction in the financial market and firms can raise
9 Perfect competition, constant return to scale in production and adjustment cost functions, and capital as the only
input that is costly to adjust.
Table 3.
Source of funds for different industry sectors, (%)
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whatever funds they need, then a change in the firm’s net worth does not change the investment
decision, as long as Tobins q is constant. However, if the financial market is not perfect, and
thus internal and external funds are not perfect substitutes, the standard Tobin’s q theory no
longer holds. As discussed in the previous section, with imperfect information where the
external funds are more expensive than internal funds, firms which have lower cash flows
will probably be more constrained in their investment decision. Conversely, firms which have
large cash flows can finance their investment internally and are likely to be less constrained
in their investment  decisions (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 1995, and Bond and Meghir,
1994). The main reason is that the leverage is related to agency costs, and thus to the premium
on external finance, leading to a negative effect on their investment. A vast literature shows
that high leverage aggravates agency problems (Jansen and Meckling, 1976 and Myers, 1977).
Myers (1977), for example, shows that due to debt overhang, positive NPV projects will not be
carried out as the equity needed to finance these projects will not be provided by shareholders.
The dynamic version of Tobin’s q, as derived in Appendix 1, augmented by sales variable
is given by :
where i = 1, ...., n indexes companies, t = 1, ....., T indexes time. 
I
K  denotes the
investment rate, e i,t is a disturbance term. Q is the average q as a proxy for marginal q (Hayashi,
1982). X is cash flow, Y is sales, B is total borrowing. As aforementioned, we expect β1, β2, β3, to
be positive, β1 to be positive under an imperfect financial market and β5 to be negative due to
agency costs/bankruptcy costs.
We can further predict that under asymmetric information, the sensitivity of investment
to cash flows should be different across firms. The investment of firms for which information
problems are likely more severe, such a small firms (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995),
independent firms (Hoshi et al., 1991, Elston, 1995), and young firms (Schaller, 1993) should
be more sensitive to cash flows than other firms are. Furthermore, we can also expect that
firms subject to problem emanating from asymmetric information experience a higher negative
impact of financial leverage on investment.
There are some problems with the testing of financial constraints in the context of
Tobin’s q models. If the assumption of perfect competition in the firms product market does
not hold, the average q is no longer a valid proxy for marginal q. For example, if the firm is a
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monopoly, the average q is higher than marginal q (Hayashi, 1982). An inefficient capital
market, where stock market prices are so volatile that they do not reflect the fundamental
value of firms, invalidates the average q as a measure of investment opportunities. Under such
circumstances, the initial problem of identification of the investment opportunities (demand
effects) and the financial constraint (supply effects) emerges.
An alternative approach is the Euler equation model of investment (Bond and Meghir,
1994). This framework does not rely on a firm’s stock market data (market value) to measure
investment opportunities,  hence the problem of measuring the “true value” of the q ration
could be eliminated. Instead, the approach is based on the idea that investment rates for the
next period should be positively related to the investment rate in the current period. In the
standard Euler equation, the expectation of the next investment rate, therefore, summaries the
same information as in the q ration. However, if capital market imperfection exists, the standard
Euler equation is mis-specified and other variables such as cash flows would be a significant
determinant of investment.
The Euler equation, as derived in Appendix 1 (equation A.16) and augmented by sales
variable, is given by :
where II is gross profit. In the standard Euler equation, under the null hypothesis of no
financial constraint, β1 is positive and greater than one, β2 is negative and greater than one, β3
is positive β4 is negative, β5 is zero under Modigliani-Miller debt irrelevance and negative
otherwise (Bond and Meghir, 1994). Under alternative hyphothesis, the equation (2) will be
mis-specified, i.e., the investment will be positively related to the gross profit, β4 is positive.
4.2. Identifying Constrained and Unconstrained Firms
One of the most significant implications of models of investment under asymmetric
information is that the sensitivities of investment to cash flows are different across firms,
depending on the information/agency costs encountered by the firms. To test this prediction,
we use a different sample separator. International evidence suggests that institutional features
such as affiliation to business groups or banks is essential in identifying whether firms are
likely to be financially constrained (Chirinko, 1996). Hoshi et al. (1991), for example, classify
whether a firm is affiliated with an industrial group (keiresu) which has close ties with large
banks or is an independent firm without affiliation. We follow this suggestion by dividing the
sample into firms affiliated to large business groups (conglomerates) which own forex banks
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(banks group affiliation) and non bank-group affiliation (independent) firms. The idea is that
business groups whose activities are well diversified and whose funds from different
subsidiaries are pooled and reallocated across firms could play a role in mitigating the
information problems faced by their members in accessing external funds. This is particularly
true for conglomerates in Indonesia where most of them own banks and have a special informal
relationship with state (large) banks (see Ang et al., 1997 and Chapter 4)1 0. Therefore, we can
expect that firms affiliated to these groups are less sensitive to cash flows due both to the
mitigation of the information problem and the internal capital market (Schian-tarelly, 1996).
Another classification is based on the size of firms. This criterion is frequently used to
identify firms that face information problems (for example, Harris et al., 1994, Jarmillo et al.,
1994). We can expect that small firms are more financially constrained than large firms for
several reasons: their collaterisable assets relative to their total assets are low, they lack a
‘track-record’ for external investors, their activities are less diversified (subject to idiosyncratic
risk). However, if our sample consist of firms listed on the stock market (i.e., relatively large
companies), the sample partition based on size would not reflect the agency cost they incur.
Share ownership of ‘small’ firms listed in the stock exchange tends to be less concentrated,
hence the agency problem between managers and outside investors is less severe (see for
example, Devereux and Schiantarelly, 1990). In this study, we use the total use total sales
(turnover) as the size indicator to split the sample into small and large firms.
Dividend pay-out it also used as a criterion to split a sample firms in order to analyze
the effects of cash flows on investment. The seminal work by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988), for example, shows that firms with a low dividend pay-out ratio were more sensitive to
cash flows. The reason is that low dividend firms may indicate that they have exhausted their
retention to finance their investment and consequently these ‘lemons’ will incur a higher
premium for external funds. But, whatever the reason, a low dividend payment is generally a
signal of liquidity constraints (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1989). Another criterion we use in
testing for financial constraint is the debt equity ratio (leverage). Firms with high leverage may
be expected to meet higher agency costs. The agency costs can arise from ‘moral hazard’
generated by the firms’ managers by making an excessively risky investment. The reason for
this risky behavior is that with high leverage, the firms may retain most of the profit from any
10 As in Korea, the economy in Indonesia is characterized by the dominant role played by large business groups
(conglomerates). From 304 firms listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange, more than 40% are owned by business
groups (Indonesian Business Data Centre, 1996).
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success but lenders incur most of the losses from failure due to the limited liability nature of
debt contracts.
V. Data and Econometrics Methods
5.1. Data
The company data were obtained from the Extel’s Company Research database. The
samples are unbalanced panel data extracted from 219 non financial companies listed on the
Jakarta Stock Exchange during 1993-1997. Compared with other sources such as Datastream,
the Extel’s Company Research database covers more items chosen from balance sheets, cash
flows and profit and loss accounts. Furthermore, it covers balance sheet items before the firms
went public.
Since we were estimating dynamic models, we selected only the companies with at
least three years’ observations. Furthermore, we excluded outliers, observations where
investment, capital stock or sales increased by a factor of ten or more from on year to the next.
Finally, 140 companies were selected for the Euler equation estimation. Since the estimation of
Tobin’s q models requires share market value, we constructed a second data set. The share
market value is calculated as a multiplication of the share price and the number of shares at
the reporting date, which were obtained from the Datastream’s company account. The sample
for the second set is 132 companies with at least three years’ market value data. The details of
the definition of data are presented in Appendix 2.
To select firms that are members of a large business-group, we used the following
procedures. First, we selected the 25 largest group of firms (based on their revenues), listed in
Indonesian Business Online in 1995. Second, from these 25 groups, we selected groups which
own foreign-exchange licensed banks, resulting in 16 business groups. In our sample, there
are 34 companies with a complete set of data which are members of the 16 largest
conglomerates. The other sub samples are classified by dividing the sample into two groups
of firms, based on the median of the sample.
A summary of statistics for the sample and sub sample are shown in Appendices 3
(data set for Tobin’s q) and 4 (data set for the Euler equation). The first rows of Appendices 3
and 4 report mean, median and standard deviations of selected variables for the full sample.
The heterogeneity of the sample is clearly observed. For example, average sales of firms affiliated
with a bank-group is four times larger than that of non affiliated firms, while the average sales
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of large firms is about eight times larger than that of small. It as also interesting to note that
firms with low leverage and high dividend pay-out are generally smaller (in terms of total
sales) than the high-leverage and the low dividend payout firms. The former group of firms
(low leverage and high-dividend payment) represents ‘high quality’ firms which are
characterized by high profit and low leverage (althoug not necessarily large firms). Another
interesting feature of our data is that less financially constrained firms are characterised by a
high Tobin’s q and the Tobin’s q of the affiliated firms are the highest among the groups.11
5.2. Econometric Methods
We use a dynamic panel data specification to estimate Tobin’s q models of (1) and the
Euler equation of (2), where the residual εit can be decomposed into the following components:
εit = αi + γt + vit
These subscript i refers to the firm and t refers to the time period, αi is firm –specific
effect, γt is time specific effect and vit is idiosyncratic shock.
There are several econometric issues which should be addressed in estimating (1) and
(2). First, the possible correlation between the regressors and the firms specific effects, i.e., E(xit
αi) = 0. Second, the possible edgoneneity of regressors with respect to vit, i.e. E(xit αi) =  0, for
s<t,0  otherwise. For example, the current value of cash flows and Tobins q are likely to be
correlated with the current shock to investment. Third, the possible heteroskedasticity of the
disturbance vit since the panel data covers many heterogeneous firms and several time periods.
The problems  would result in an upward based estimate of it the OLS estimator is used.
Furthermore, as shown by Blundell et al (1992), the estimate of will be downward biased if the
within-groups estimator is used. Arrelano and Bonds (1991) provide General Method of
Moments (GMM) estimators for dynamic panel data which have the above mentioned
properties. Basically, in this estimation method, the individual effects are eliminated by taking
the firs-difference of equations (1) and (2) and lagged levels of variables are used as instruments.
The use of lagged variables12 as instruments is only valid if vit serially uncorrelated, other wise
the estimator will be inconsistent. Given that vit is serially uncorrelated, in the first difference
models, the error term becomes a first-order moving average, MA (1). Hence, second order
serial correlation should not exist in ∆vit Arrelano and Bond (1991) provide tests of second-
order serial correlation together with Sargan tests of over identifying restriction, to examine
11 Pomerleano  (1998) notices that the high Tobin’s q of these large companies is possibly associated with the
‘exuberant’ valuations of portfolio inflows in the illiquid market, marked by highly sensitive valuations on
marginal flows.
12 i.e. t-2 and further lags for endogenous variables and t-1 and further lags for predetermined variables.
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the validity of instruments.
This so called first differenced GMM, GMM (DIF), estimator has been widely used in
most recent empirical literature concerning the role of financial factors in investment, including
prominent studies such as Blundell et al (1992), Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) and Bond
and Meghir (1994). However, in a recent empirical work, Hall, Mairesse, and  Mulkay (1998)
found that the GMM method of estimation results in much imprecision in the estimated
parameters. Using simulation studies, Alonso-Borrego and Arrelano (1996) also fund that the
first differences GMM estimator produces a large sample bias and poor precision, particularly
in the setting of dynamic panel data models with a small number of time series observations
and large autogressive parameter. The problem stems from the “weak instruments” of the
levels of variables in the first-difference equations. Some progress has been made by Blundell
and Bond (1998) to improve the GMM estimator by introducing additional restrictions on the
initial conditions process which allows the use of lagged first differences of variables in the
levels equations, in addition to lagged levels instruments in the first differenced equations as
in the first differenced GMM. They show that the ‘system GMM’, GMM (SYS), provides more
precise parameter estimates and reduces small sample biases. Since our sample is also
characterized by small number of time series observations, we follow this approach and use
the DPD98 program (Arrelano and Bond, 1998) which was run in the Gauss 386i. Because of
heteroskedastic nature of the data, a two-step estimation procedure provided by the DPD98
program was used to obtain a more efficient estimation.
VI. Empirical Results
6.1.   Tobin’s q-model of Investment
Table 4 reports Tobin’s q model of investment of a full sample of data, estimated by the
GMM (SYS) and GMM (DIF). The two estimation procedures generate different results. We gain
higher precision in the parameters estimated and obtained the a priori sign of the coefficients
when using GMM (SYS). Using GMM (SYS), we find, however, coefficient of Tobin’s q is significant
at only around 10%; but the coefficient on sales is highly significant. By contrast, using GMM
(DIF), the coefficient on Tobin’s q is not significant and the coefficient of sales is negative and
significant. The Sargan tests of the two estimators do not reject validity of the instruments used
and m2 statistic do not reject the hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the differenced
residuals. The m1 statistic do show significant negative first-order serial correlation in the differenced
residuals, ∆vit which is to be expected if the levels residuals vit are serially uncorrelated.
Given the superiority of the GMM (SYS), we focus on the results estimated by this
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estimator. The most interesting finding is that coefficient of cash flows is large, positive and
highly significant. If Tobin’s q as well as sales could perfectly control the expected profitability,
then the significance of cash flows in the investment equation supports the financial constraint
hypothesis. In particular, the results indicate imperfect substitutability between external and
internal finance, i.e. cash flows provide a cheaper form of finance. Another interesting result
is that the coefficient of leverage (debt to capital ration) has the expected sign (negative) and is
highly  significant when we estimate it by using GMM (SYS). This supports the hypothesis
that the agency costs are higher when the amount of debt is relatively large. Accordingly, the
fact that high leveraged firms have to pay the greater premium on external finance leads to a
negative impact on investment. This result parallel to those of Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996)
and Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1995).
We now turn to the sub-sample results (Table 5). As the GMM (SYS) outperforms the
GMM (DIF) estimator, we only use the GMM (SYS) for sub-sample estimations. Tobin’s q
coefficient for firms affiliated to bank and business groups are positive and significant, as our
prior hypothesis. By contrast, the corresponding coefficient for non affiliated firms is not
significant. The coefficients of sales are positive and highly significant for both classes of
firms, but the accelerator effect for affiliated firms is larger than that of nonaffiliated firms. The
most interesting result is that the coefficients of cash flows are positive and highly significant
for the two groups of firms, meaning that the financial factor is important for both groups.
However, surprisingly, the coefficient of cash flows for affiliated group firms larger than the
corresponding coefficient for non affiliated firms. This finding is robust across different sub-
sampling criteria (Table 6-8). That is, the investment-cash flows sensitivities for those firms
classified as less financially constrained are greater than those classified as financially
constrained firms. The t-statistics for the difference between cash flow coefficients in different
classes of firms are significant in all sample splits. Although the monotonicity of the
relationship between the investment-cash flows sensitivity and the degree of financial
constraint is still a subject of debate (see Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 and Fazzari, Hubbard
and Petersen, 1996), we need to justify these counter-intuitive results. Devereux and
Schiantarelli (1990) found similar results for UK firms and argue that this can happen if the
larger firms tend to have lower relative cash flows. However, this is not supported by our
sample data (see Appendix 2 and 3). An alternative possible explanation is that since the
sample covers only the listed firms, there probably is ‘a selection bias in favour of picking only
the best of small firms’ (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990, pp.83).
Objections of mis-measurement have been raised in respect of Tobin’s q by many critics.
In particular, it does not entirely capture investment opportunities, therefore cash flow terms
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may contain information about future investment opportunities. For example, firms with low
cash flows could have low investment merely because they have few investment opportunities.
Another reason is that strict assumption of using average as the proxy of marginal q, such as
perfect competition in the output market, may be violated. Moreover, an inefficient stock market
in developing countries, such as Indonesia, leads to share values being an imperfect proxy for
fundamentals and Tobin’s q can be mismeasured in consequence. Finally, as pointed out by
Hayashi and Inoue (1991), Tobin’s q model is more appropriate for an individual unit than for
a holding company. In fact, our sample contains some holding companies.1 3 We address the
problem of the mismeasurement of Tobin’s q by estimating the Euler equation (sub-section
4.2).
The estimates of leverage (debt-capital ratio) coefficients provide interesting results
(Table 5). The results consistently show that the coefficient on debt ratio for firms classified as
financially unconstrained are positive and significant, while those for the constrained firms
are negative and significant. These significant differences between the debt coefficients for the
two groups of firms (as show by the t-statistics for coefficient differences) support the hypothesis
that the agency costs or premium of debt funds for the constrained firms are higher than for
the unconstrained firms. One possible explanation of the positive and significant coefficient
non leverage for the affiliated firms is their interlocking relationship with domestic banks and
their access to foreign sources of funds as suggested by large capital inflows in the periods of
sample (see Pomerleano, 1998, Claessen, 1998). The findings are consistent with Harris et. Al.
(1994) who exploit the standard accelerator model of investment using a 1981-1988 sample.
13 For exmple, Bimantara, Kalbe Farma, Bakrie Brothers.
Table 4.
Tobin’s q model of investments, full sample 132 firms
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They find positive debt-capital ratio coefficients for large firms both members of conglomerates
and independent. They argue that these findings may suggest that for larger firms, a high
degree of leverage may act as signal of creditworthiness. At the same time, positive and
significant coefficients of leverage and high dividend pay-out firms may be attributable to the
high quality firms. In fact., q the less financially constrained firms is higher than for the
constrained firms (see descriptive data in Appendix 2). This is consistent with the view
investment by firms white a high q, i.e. whose valuable investment opportunities are recognized
by the capital market, are less effected by leverage (see Lang et al., 1996).
Notes :
1. Value in parentheses are t-statistics derived from asymptotic standard errors which
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity.
2. m1 and m2 are tests for first and second order serial correlation in the first differences
residuals, asymptotically distributed as normal distribution under the null of no serial
correlation.
3. Wald test is a test of joint significance of the coefficients, asymptotically distributed as χ2
under the null  of no-significance.
4. Sargan is a test the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the
null of instrument validity.
5. The instruments used in each equation are
GMM(DIF) - (I/K)i,t-2, .. (I/K)i,t-4; qi,t-2, .. qi,t-4 ;(Y/K)i,t-2, .. (Y/K)i,t-4;(X/K)i,t-2, .. (X/K)i,t-4 ;(B/K)i,t-2,
..(B/K)i,t-4. GMM(SYS) - first difference equations - as GMM(DIF); level equations - ∆(I/K)i,t1,
∆qi,t-1, ∆(Y/K)i,t-1, ∆(X/K)i,t-1; ∆(B/K)i,t-1.
6.2. The Euler equation
Table 6 reports the Euler equation results for full a sample of data, estimated by the
GMM (SYS) and GMM (DIF). Again, the GMM (SYS) estimates parameters more precisely.
First, comparison between coefficients on the lagged investment term from the two estimators
indicates that the coefficients are correctly signed and significant, but the coefficient estimated
by GMM (SYS) is about twice as large as than by GMM (DIF) and is also more precise. This is
also the case for coefficients of the lagged squared investment term. Although it is correctly
signed, the coefficients is not significant when it is estimated by GMM (DIF). The coefficients
of gross profit estimated by the two procedures are positive and significant. This is contrary to
 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Juni 2000166
Table 5.
Tobin’s q model of investments across heterogeneous firms
the prediction of the theoretical model under the null of no financial constraints. The theory
predicts that under a perfect capital market where firms can raise funds as much as they wish
for investment at a given real opportunity cost, this term, which reflects the marginal revenue
product of capital should be negative. Thus, the positive sign of gross profits term could reflect
the marginal revenue product of capital should be negative. Thus, the positive sign of gross
profits term could reflect the existence of financial constrains in the capital market. This is
consistent with the previous finding using Tobin’s q model.
Next, we divide the sample into two groups of firms, as before. There results are presented
in Table 7. Broadly speaking, the coefficients on lagged investment terms and squared
investment terms are significant and correctly signed in all sub-samples. However, the
magnitude of the coefficients is significantly different from what was expected according to
the theoretical model under the assumption of perfect capital market. The coefficients on gross
profit ratio are also positive and highly significant in all sub-samples, contrary to what was
predicted by the basic Euler equation. In the basic Euler equation (under a perfect capital
market), this coefficients should be zero. These all suggest that the basic theoretical fails to
14 Non bank group affiliated firms are an exception ; here the coefficient is positive but not significant at 5%
a
a
Notes: See note of Table 1, a t-statistik for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on cash flows (and debt) of the
two groups are the same
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characterize the investment data, a fact which is consistent the presence of financially
constrained firms. Comparison between the coefficient of profit for unconstrained and
constrained firms indicates no significant differences of the investment-profit sensitivities between
unconstrained and constrained firms, except that high leverage firms are more investment
profit sensitive than are low leverage firms. Finally, signs of the coefficients on the debt term are
consistent with those estimated in Tobin’s q model, i.e., positive and highly significant for less
constrained firms, and negative for constrained firms.1 4 Moreover, the t-statistics for differences
of debt coefficients between the two groups of firms are significant in all cases.
Notes :
1. Value in parentheses are t-statistics derived from asymptotic standard errors which
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity.
2. m1 and m2 are tests for first and second order serial correlation in the first differenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as normal distribution under the null of no serial
correlation.
3. Wald test is a test of joint significance of the coefficients, asymptotically distributed as X2
under the null of no-significance.
4. Sargan is a test the overidentying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the
null of instrument validity.
5. The instruments used in each equation are
GMM(DIF) - (I/K)i,t-2,..(I/K)i,t-4;(I/K)2i,t-2,..(I/K)2i,t-4;(Y/K)i,t-2,..(Y/K)i,t-4;(P/K)i,t-2,..(P/K)i,t-4;(B/
K)2i,t-2,..(B/K)2i,t,GMM(SYS) - differented equations - as GMM(DIF); level equations - ∆(I/K)i,t-1,
Table 6.
Euler model of investment, full sample 140 firms.
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∆(I/K)2i,t-1, ∆(Y/K)i,t-1; ∆(B/K)2i,t-1
VII. Conclusion and Policy Implication
We have investigated the role of financial factor in firms’ investment using panel data
of Indonesia companies publicly traded in the Jakarta Stock Exchange within the sample
period 1993-1997. The main objective is to investigate whether the Indonesian firms’ investment
is constrained by the availability of finance and whether some types of firms are more affected
by financial constraint. The investigation was carried out using the Tobin’s q and the Euler
models of investment augmented by financial variables (cash flows/profit and leverage) and
estimated by a new econometric technique the ‘system-GMM’ developed by Blundell and
Bond (1998). The full sample results generated by the two models robustly indicates that the
cash flow terms were positive and highly significant, while the leverage term is negative and
significant in the Tobin’s q and insignificant in the Euler model. This evidence on the effect of
cash flows and leverage is consistent with the possibility of financial constraints and the
existence of agency costs of debt finance.
In spite of convincing evidence for the existence of financial constraint in full sample
data, testing for financial constraints needs to examine the differentials behavior of financially
Table 7.
Euler equation of investment across heterogenous firms
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constrained and unconstrained firms. We classify firms into these groups based on their
institutional characteristics (firms affiliation with bank-business groups), size of firms (sales
turnover) and financial conditions (financial leverage and dividend pay out). Evidence from
the role of the cash flow investment equation indicates the existence of financial constrains for
firms that are a priori classified as both financially constrained and unconstrained.  The most
striking result is that firms’ investment, taking unconstrained and constrained firms responds
differently to degrees of financial leverage. The investment spending by financially constrained
firms responds negatively to the degree of financial leverage. This is not suppressing as the
increasing leverage reduces funds for investment and simultaneously reduces the ability of
firms to raise funds from outside sources. In contrast, for financially unconstrained firms,
such as firms affiliated with large banks and business groups, leverage does not affect
investment spending. Although, there is no clear government policy to support the large
business groups as Chaebol firms in Korea, these business groups, in fact, enjoy a favored
relationship with state banks. Other financially less constrained firms, such as lower leverage
and higher pay-out firms, which are also characterized by high Tobin’s q, responds positively
to leverage. The findings have in common with those of Lang et al. (1995) that ‘leverage
matters more than operating cash flow in explaining investment differentials.
The evidence provides some support to the financial constraint hypothesis and indirectly
proves the broad credit channel of monetary policy. The implications on monetary policy
formulation are as follows. The response of the real sector to a monetary policy shock depends
upon the financial structure of firms, the segmentation of the financial market between large
and small firms, and the degree of financial/credit friction in the capital/credit market. Hence,
the authorities should monitor a broad range of indicators regarding the microeconomic
aspects of firms and banks. In addition to banks’ balance sheets, survey on corporates’ balances
sheets should be conducted by the monetary authorities. Data such as ability of firms to access
to banks’ credit, debt to equity ratio and banks willingness to lend at least provide indicators
on financial friction in the credit market.1 5
As far as the financial crisis in Southeast Asia is concerned, although still a subject of
debate (see IMF, 1999), some provided evidence that the credit channel operates in countries
in the region in the aftermath of the crisis (Ding at al., 1998, Kim, 1999, and Ito and Da Silva,
1999). Accordingly, monetary authorities should be aware of the possible amplification and
distributional effect of their policy. Otherwise, there is a risk that the monetary policy could be
‘overkilling’ (Domac and Ferri, 1998) the economy, largely due to its severe impact to small
15 Federal Reserve, for example, constructs an index of banks’ willingness to lend
 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Juni 2000170
and medium enterprises.
The credit channel controversies surrounding the financial crisis in Indonesia bequeath
a future research agenda. The Asian financial crisis, characterized by disruption due to credit
flows a s result of the collapse of banks/financial intermediation, resembles the Great
Depression in 1930s, and is thus perhaps an interesting setting for research on the ‘malfunction
of financial institutions’ in the propagation of the financial crisis, as conducted by Bernanke
(1983) when pioneering the notion of the credit channel.
Appendix 1.
Derivation of The Tobin’s q model and the Euler equation
Firms maximize the expected present discounted value of existing shareholders by
maximizing dividend flows :
Max Vt = Et Σ  βtt+j Dt+j (A.1)
                            
  j=0
sources of funds the sum of cash flows and funds raised from external sources, net of
costs of external borrowings and agency costs. The Where E, denotes expectation operator
given information set at period t, β1+j the nominal discounted factors between period t to t+j, D1
dividend (i.e., distributed profit). The value maximization is subject to the capital accumulation.
Kt = (1 - δ) Kt-i + I1 (A.2)
And the cash flows identity, i.e., the sources and uses of funds must be balanced. The
sources of funds include the sum of cash flows and funds raised from external sources, net of
costs of external borrowings and agency costs.The uses of funds comprises distributed profit
(dividend) and new capital expenditures. Assuming zero-tax and unity of prices of capital
and output for simplicity, the cash flow balance follows this identity.
F(Kt,Lt) – J(Kt,It) - ωtLt – itBt-1 + ∆Bt- A[Bt,Kt,Xt] = Dt + It (A.3)
Where, Xt = F(Kt,Lt) – J(Kt,It)−ωt,Lt, is cash flow. Kt is capital stock, It gross investment, Lt
labour inputs, ω price of labour, Bt is stock of debt, it is capital stock, is the  rate on debts. Ft(.)
is gross production function, Jt(.) is installment/adjustment cost function, Fi(.)  Jt(.) Is net
output  production. At(.) is the agency costs, positively related to Bt and negatively related to
capital stock and cash flows Xt.
∞
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The first order conditions are :
Lt[1-AX(t)][FL(t) - wt] = 0 (A.4)
Bt[1-AB(t)] - Et[(1+ it+1)βt+1] = 0 (A.5)
It[1-Ax(t)] JI(t)-1+λt = 0 (A.6)
Kt[1-AX(t)][FK(t) - JK(t)] -Ak(t) -λt + Et[(1-δ)λt+1βt+1] =0 (A.7)
where AX, Aβ, AK denotes the partial derivative of the agency costs with respect to X,B
and K. Elimination of λt by subtituting equation (A.6) into (A.7) results in what so called Euler
equation for capital :
[1-AX(t)][FK(t) - JK(t)] - AK(t) - Et[1-(1-δ)βt+1] =
It[1-AX(t)]JI(t)-1-AX(t+1)JI(t+1) Et[(1-δ)βt+1] (A.8)
According to (A.8), the optimal condition requires that the marginal cost of investment
today must be equal to the marginal return of the new unit of capital net of its user costs and
plus saving in marginal adjustment costs due to the absence of tomorrow’s investment.
q model of investment can be derived from adding of A.4-A.7, cash flow balance and
homogeneity properties of F(.), G(.) and A(.):
(1-δ)λtKt-1 - Et[(1-δ)λt+1βt+1Kt] = Dt + (1+it)Bt-1 (A.9)
Solving A.9 recursively forward and using A.2 and A.6 generates the following equation:
  βt-1Vt + (1+it)Bt-1
[1-AX(t)]Jt(t) = ------------------------------- -1 (A.10)
    (1-δ)Kt-1
The right hand sight of A.10 is deviation of market value of firms’ equity and debt to
unity (the average q) which is exactly equal to the marginal adjustment costs. Linearization of
A.10 around sample means produces the linear model of investment as follow :
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 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Juni 2000172
*
*
/.3
*
*
/.
* 1
*)/*(
;
1
*)/*(
;)1(
1
; 210
X
KBX
X
KXX
X A
AKI
A
AKI
Aa
b
−
=
−
=
−
== ββββ
where superscript * denotes evaluation at sample means β1, β2 are positive and βj negative.
Equation A.11 can be added by output-capital ratio,  ,  Y1   to control demand
     Kt
effect that are not adequately captured by the q, resulting the model as presented in
equation (1) in the text.
In the Euler equation A.8, marginal profits from capital are unobserved. Using A.4 and
linear homogeneity assumption for F(.) And G(.), we can write :
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(A.12)
where Π  is the firm sales minus variable costs. The adjustment cost function is assumed
to follow a quadratic form :
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Assuming that AX(.) = 0 i.e., agency costs is dependent on cash flows and the agency
costs function follows the form :
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Subtituting A.11 - A.13 into A.8 we obtain the Euler equation :
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where ρt = (1-δ)βi+1* The parameters of A.15 are :
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The rate of discount term is replaced by firm specific effects. In the empirical model we
also introduce output-capital ratio which may be significant if the product market is imperfect.
Equation A.15 can be rearranged to obtain the following model, as equation (2) in the text.
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where β1 positive, β2, β3 and β4 negative.
Appendix 2. Definition of variables used
Investment (It) is calculated as the tangible fixed assets (property, plants and land)
acquired less tangibles fixed assets sold.
Replacement value of capital stock (Kt) is calculated by the formula :
Kt = Kt-1 + It-DEPt
where DEPt is the depreciation and we choose 1992 as the initial year in calculating the
recursive formula.
Gross cash flow (Xt) is profit after tax plus depreciation.
Sales are gross sales or turnover.
Debts (Dt) is calculated as the sum of both short and long-term securities and loans
including overdrafts.
Cash and liquids (Ft) are cash and its equivalent, including cash on hand, cash at bank
and short term deposits.
Tobin’s q is proxied by average q(Q) calculated by the formula :
Qt = (Vt+Bt-Ft)/(Kt+Nt)
where :
V = market value of share
B = market value of debt
F = market value of financial assets
N = market value of inventories
K = market value of the capital stock
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